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In this article, Professors Robert Chang and Jerome Culp exam-
ine the state of race in America in the aftermath of the landmark Su-
preme Court decision of Brown v. Board of Education. Their find-
ings reveal that while Brown established fundamental precedent in the
area of race relations, racial inequality remains entrenched in a num-
ber of modern social institutions. Chang and Culp analyze this di-
lemma by focusing on three distinct trends. First, a cycle of inequality
is driven by racial disparities in wealth and perpetuated by the inter-
locking systems of education, housing, family, health care, employ-
ment, and criminal justice. Second, civil rights activists often fall
short of their goals following Brown due to an overall system of op-
pression described as civil rights myopia. Finally, racial remediation
schemes also face major obstacles as white identity has intensified
since Brown- As a result, little has changed in the ten-year window
preceding Brown's fiftieth anniversary and racial inequality remains a
persistent problem in America.
I. INTRODUCTION
Every ten years or so, there are various conferences and symposia
that revisit Brown v. Board of Education.' While these discussions are
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1. We refer collectively to two decisions as Brown. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (declaring unconstitutional de jure segregation in state public schooling) (Brown I); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (providing for federal court oversight of local authorities charged
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important, we wonder if the conversations taking place during this fifti-
eth anniversary are much different from those that took place during the
fortieth.2 In this article, we try to understand why these discussions
might be the same. From our findings, we believe that race will continue
to have an unfortunate salience for racial minorities with regard to op-
portunity and outcome and that the promises of Brown will remain un-
fulfilled on Brown's hundredth anniversary, leaving yet another group of
judges, lawyers, academicians, politicians, and students to ponder the
continuing conundrum that is race in America.
Part I begins by looking at what has changed with regard to racial
groups in an approximate ten-year window preceding Brown's fiftieth
anniversary. We focus on racial wealth disparities and examine briefly
the way that interlocking systems or social institutions of education,
housing, family, health care, employment, and criminal justice operate to
maintain these disparities. In Part II, we examine the problem of civil
rights myopias, drawing lessons from an early Asian American challenge
to segregated education, the early League of United Latin American
Citizens (LULAC) litigation strategy challenging racial discrimination,
and the more recent resistance of the African American community to
gay/lesbian/bisexual civil rights claims.3 In Part III, the focus shifts away
from racial minorities to look at the white majority. Following the
Brown litigation, white racial identity intensified.
II. STUCK IN A MOMENT
During a moment of optimism thirteen years ago, one of us de-
clared an "African American Moment," a time "when different and
blacker voices will speak new words and remake old legal doctrines."4
with implementing desegregation) (Brown II). As for representative symposia and conferences, see
infra note 2.
2. Compare Symposium, Brown@50, 47 How. L.J. 1 (2003), and Symposium, The Quest for
Equal Educational Opportunity: Brown Nears 50, San Antonio Turns 30, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1339
(2003), with Symposium, Brown v. Board of Education After Forty Years: Confronting the Promise, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 337 (1995), and Symposium, Brown v. Board of Education, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 3
(1995), and Conference, Brown at Forty, Amherst College (December 1994), in RACE, LAW, AND
CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (Austin Sarat ed., 1997).
3. We use this locution because we have used it before. See Robert S. Chang & Jerome M.
Culp, Jr., Nothing and Everything: Race, Romer, and (Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 229, 230 n.3 (1997) (noting that the three categories follow the language of Colorado's
Amendment 2). We recognize the importance of labels and how they may intentionally and uninten-
tionally exclude. For example, we mean to include transgendered persons. At times, we use "queer"
to denote these communities and particular political stances, following Francisco Valdes, Queer Mar-
gins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of "Sex-
ual Orientation," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1295 n.6 (1997). We argue, though, about the mainstreaming
effect that the popularity of shows like Will and Grace or Queer Eye for the Straight Guy is having on
queerness. One of us argues that the shows have an aspect of exoticization akin to mascoting whereas
the other sees more the transformative possibilities. We leave it to the readers to guess which of us
holds each view.
4. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings,
1991 DUKE L.J. 39,40.
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Two years later, the other of us followed suit and declared a similar
"Asian American Moment."5 These declarations came during the emer-
gence of critical race theory in the legal academy.6 While different voices
did, indeed, speak new words and challenge old doctrines,7 the hope re-
flected in these declarations seems naive in light of the entrenched racial
inequality that we protested. Instead of a period of racial advancement,
we have found ourselves stuck in a different kind of moment, character-
ized by what we call the inequality cycle.9
The inequality cycle is our description for racial inequality that is
entrenched through systems or social institutions that operate to main-
tain or further inequality. In measuring racial inequality, we use wealth,
rather than income, as its primary indicator.1" The number of such inter-
locking systems or social institutions that play a role in the inequality cy-
cle is quite large, but we will touch on six: education, housing, family,
health care, employment, and criminal justice.
A. Wealth as a Measure of Racial Inequality
First, we examine a snapshot of racial wealth inequality using 1993
and 2000 data comparing non-Hispanic white (white), black, and His-
panic households." We do not include Asian Americans, Pacific Island-
5. Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1245 (1993), 1 ASIAN L.J. 1,5 (1993).
6. For two accounts of its beginnings, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN
STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUrTING EDGE (2000) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE]. A different account that centers student movements can be found in
Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory's Cutting Edge: Key Movements That
Performed the Theory, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 32 (Fran-
cisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter CROSSROADS].
7. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, supra note 6; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CuTrING EDGE, supra note 6.
8. This is not to say that we were unaware of the entrenched nature of racial inequality as our
other work around that time reflects. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and
the 1991 Civil Rights Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 967
(1993) (discussing the limitations of the Act and the continuing failure of legislation to "raise and an-
swer the race question"); Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the Family, and the
Dream That Is America, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1115 (1996) (discussing the difficulties of preserv-
ing affirmative action in the face of explicit and implicit white resistance).
9. We are not, of course, the first to think of inequality as consisting of an ongoing cycle that
perpetuates itself. For two recent scholars who use this idea, see Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry:
A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000); Berta E. Hernndez-Truyol,
Breaking Cycles of Inequality: Critical Theory, Human Rights and Family In/justice, in CROSSROADS,
supra note 6, at 345.
10. In doing so, we follow Oliver and Shapiro, who argue persuasively that wealth is a better
indicator of racial inequality than income, noting that "even when Blacks and Whites display similar
characteristics-for example, are on a par educationally and occupationally -a potent difference of
$43,143 in home equity and financial assets still remains." MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHfwHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY 2, 8 (1995).
11. We will generally use "white" to refer to those in the Census category "non-Hispanic white."
We understand that the Census has denoted "Hispanic" to be an ethnic category which may include all
races and that there are ethnic Hispanics who identify as racially white.
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ers, and Native Americans in the table that follows because the data is
unavailable due to the continuing failure of the U.S. Census to include
these groups in its reports on wealth and asset ownership. Information
for these groups can be found in different reports that typically assess in-
come and poverty, but not wealth and assets. One commentator sur-
mises that "[a]lthough data regarding the wealth of Asian Americans is
not available, it is likely that it is lower, as Asian Americans have a lower
rate of home ownership and business ownership"12 and a higher poverty
rate, even though Asian American household median income is higher
than that of whites. 3 A similar conclusion can likely be drawn about Na-
tive Americans based on median income, poverty rates, and home and
business ownership.
I4
Comparisons between groups over time are further complicated by
the way that the Census continues to tinker with its categories. 5 In 1990,
there were five racial categories: "White; Black; American Indian, Es-
kimo, and Aleut; Asian and Pacific Islander; and Other race."' 6 In 2000,
there were at least five or six, not counting the new "two or more races"
quasi-category, 7 with Asian and Pacific Islander at times disaggregated.18
12. Spencer Overton, Voices from the Past: Race, Privilege, and Campaign Finance, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1541, 1550 n.37 (2001) (citation omitted).
13. Id. With regard to median household income, three factors-number of workers in the
household, education, and area of residence-may account for much of the difference. See Chang,
supra note 5, at 1262-63 (noting that Asian American households have more workers than white
households, Asian Americans need more years of education to reach income parity with whites, and
Asian Americans are concentrated in coastal metropolitan areas that have correspondingly higher
incomes and higher costs of living).
14. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION:
2000 (2002), at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbrOl-15.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
15. How groups are constituted by the Census is complicated and changes over time. For exam-
ple, "a person who was included in the Asian Indian category in 1980 and 1990 census tabulations
might have been included in different categories previously: Hindu in 1920-40, Other race in 1950-60,
and White in 1970." U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS STATISTICS ON POPULATION
TOTALS BY RACE, 1790 TO 1990, AND BY HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1970 to 1990, FOR THE UNITED STATES,
REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES 5 n.7 (2002), at http://www.census.gov/population/www/
documentation//twps0056.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004). The ethnic Hispanic census category
emerged in 1980 after being "Persons of Spanish Mother Tongue" in 1950 and 1960 and "Persons of
Both Spanish Surname and Spanish Mother Tongue in 1970." See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s 82 (2d ed.
1994).
16. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACIAL AND ETHNIC CLASSIFICATIONS USED IN CENSUS 2000
AND BEYOND (2000), at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html (last
visited Aug. 24, 2004).
17. See Naomi Mezey, Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race and the National Imagination,
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1701, 1760 (2003). For the debate over the multiracial category, see Tanya Kateri
Herndndez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57
MD. L. REV. 97 (1998); Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1997); Luis Angel Toro, "A People
Distinct from Others": Race and Identity in Federal Indian Law and the Hispanic Classification in OMB
Directive No. 15,26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1219 (1995).
18. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2000 (2001),
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr0l-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) ("Asian" racial cate-
gory is defined separately from the "Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander" category), with U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, The ASIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH
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We digress in discussing these "other groups" only to highlight what is
missing-as the "other groups" question is an important part of our
methodology. 9
TABLE 1
MEDIAN WEALTH BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN
20
1993 2000
non-Hispanic $45,740 $79,400
White
Black $4,418 $7,500
Hispanic $4,656 $9,750
As evidenced by the Census data, from 1993 to 2000, median house-
hold wealth increased for all three groups. 2' Black wealth, however, re-
mained fairly steady near ten percent of white wealth, while Hispanic
wealth appeared to increase slightly from approximately ten percent in
1993 to twelve percent of white wealth in 2000, although this marginal in-
crease is not statistically significant.2 2 This seems to indicate that when
comparing 1993 to 2000, black and Hispanic households, in the aggre-
gate, are not catching up to white households. This decreasing income
gap between blacks and whites has been the focus of much attention,
23
but the relative wealth differences hold true regardless of income levels.2 4
This can be seen by comparing median household wealth by income
quintile.'
2002: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (2003), at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-540.pdf
(last visited Feb. 29, 2004) (aggregating the two). Another change, "American Indian, Eskimo, and
Aleut" to "American Indian and Alaska Native" seems nonsubstantive.
19. See infra note 105.
20. These figures are drawn from T. J. ELLER & WALLACE FRAUER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
ASSET OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS 9 (1993), at http://www.census.gov/prd/l/pop/p70-47.pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2004); SHAWNA ORZECHOWSKI & PETER SEPIELLI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NET
WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS: 1998 AND 2000 14, at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/p70-88.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004) [hereinafter NET WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP OF
HOUSEHOLDS]. The Hispanic origin category of the Census is understood to be an ethnic, not a racial,
category.
21. These figures are drawn from T. J. ELLER & WALLACE FRAUER, supra note 20, at 9, at http://
www.census.gov/prd/l/pop/p70-47.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004); NET WORTH AND ASSET
OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 20.
22. Cf. ELIZABETH M. GRIECO & RACHEL C. CASSIDY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 12 n.15 (2000) (noting "[tihe median net worth difference between his-
panic and black households is not statistically significant").
23. See, e.g., Stephen Moore, The Haves and the Have-lesses, NAT'L REV., Mar. 6, 2000, at 30;
Editorial, "The Greatest Century Ever," ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec. 26, 1999, at G02 (citing a Cato
Institute study reporting that during the last century, "income for black Americans has increased 10-
fold and the income gap between whites and blacks has been cut in half").
24. See supra note 20.
25. See supra note 20.
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TABLE 2
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD WEALTH BY INCOME QUINTILE 26
Quintile Non-Hispanic White Black Hispanic
Lowest
1993 $7,605 $250 $499
2000 24,000 57 500
Second
1993 27,057 3,406 2,900
2000 48,500 5,275 5,670
Third
1993 36,341 8,480 6,313
2000 59,500 11,500 11,200
Fourth
1993 54,040 20,745 20,100
2000 92,842 32,600 36,225
Highest
1993 128,350 45,023 55,923
2000 208,023 65,141 73,032
However, an initial comparison between 1993 and 2000 is difficult
because the figures are not corrected for inflation.27 If we do so, using
Census methodology,' you get the following table, with dollar amounts
in 2000 dollars.
TABLE 3
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD WEALTH BY INCOME QUINTILE, ADJUSTED TO
2000 DOLLARS
Quintile Non-Hispanic White Black Hispanic
Lowest
1993 $8,815 $290 $578
2000 24,000 66 580
Second
1993 31,362 3,948 3,361
2000 48,500 5,275 5,670
Third
1993 42,123 9,829 7,317
2000 59,500 11,500 11,200
Fourth
1993 62,638 24,046 23,298
2000 92,842 32,600 36,225
Highest
1993 148,770 52,186 64,820
2000 208,023 65,141 73,032
At least three disturbing trends are evident. The first, as noted
above, is that very significant wealth differences between the groups per-
26. See supra note 20. The quintile upper limits for 1993 in ascending order were as follows:
$1071, $1963, $2995, $4635. For 2000, they were: $1304, $2426, $3813, $5988.
27. When adjusted for inflation, there was an actual gain in median wealth from 1993 to 2000.
NET WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 20.
28. A multiplier is required that converts 1993 dollars into 2000 dollars. The median household
wealth was $37,587 in 1993 using 1993 dollars. This translates into $43,567 using 2000 dollars. See NET
WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 20, at tbl.B. The multiplier is equal to
43,567 divided by 37,587, or approximately 1.1591. The 1993 dollars may be converted into 2000 dol-
lars by multiplying the figures in the 1993 column by the multiplier.
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sist at every income level. The second is that blacks and Hispanics are,
for the most part, not catching up and often are falling behind their white
counterparts. 9 If you compare the wealth of black and Hispanic house-
holds as a percentage of the correlative white household, you find that
the percentage often declines from 1993 to 2000. The third, and perhaps
most disturbing trend, is that the poorest black and Hispanic households
have lost ground. This is most evident in the lowest quintile where white
household wealth increased dramatically from $8815 to $24,000, whereas
black wealth declined and Hispanic wealth remained steady.
A fourth trend, not shown in Table 2, is that the number of white
households increases steadily as you move from the lowest quintile to the
highest.' Using the year 2000 data, there were 13,992,000 white house-
holds in the lowest quintile and 17,518,000 households in the highest.3
The reverse occurs for blacks, with 4,007,000 households in the lowest
quintile, decreasing to 1,505,000 in the highest.32 A similar trend occurs
with Hispanic households, although the decline is not as dramatic as it is
for blacks with 2,314,000 in the lowest and 1,080,000 in the highest.33
While white households are overrepresented at the top income quintiles,
black and Hispanic households are overrepresented at the bottom.
A final observation is that in the year 2000, white households in the
bottom income quintile (annual income less than $15,648) had a median
net worth of $24,000, whereas black and Hispanic households in the third
quintile (annual income between $29,112 and $45,756) had median net
worths of $11,500 and $11,200, respectively. 4 Phrased differently, the
median wealth of black and Hispanic households that earned two or
three times as much as the top earning white household in the bottom in-
come quintile had less than half the median wealth of bottom quintile
white households.
Our basic conclusion from this snapshot is that when we use wealth
as the primary indicator, the economic health of black and Hispanic
households has generally not improved relative to their white counter-
parts, and in many cases, has worsened. Although we used 1993 and
2000 data, we can safely surmise that the picture has worsened for black
and Hispanic households during the recent economic downturn.35 Thus,
29. In each income quintile, black wealth is increasing at a slower rate than white wealth. For
Hispanics, their wealth is increasing at a slower rate in the bottom and top quintiles, but is increasing
at a slightly higher rate in the second through fourth income quintiles. We would argue that the gain
in the second and third quintiles is negligible given the starting point.
30. NET WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 20.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1622, 1631-32 (2003) (discuss-
ing the impact of the recent economic downturn on black and Hispanic workers). One stark example
comes from New York City where a recent study reports that "nearly one of every two black men be-
tween 16 and 64 was not working." See Janny Scott, Nearly Half of Black Men Found Jobless, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at B1 (citing a study by the Community Service Society looking at actual jobless-
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the picture at Brown's fiftieth anniversary does not look much different
that it did at its fortieth.
B. The Inequality Cycle
We return now to the question of why things have not changed in
the last fifty years. Because of the interlocking systems or social institu-
tions of education, housing, family, health care, employment, and crimi-
nal justice, it is unlikely that they will change.
Our beginning hypothesis is that wealth begets wealth. It operates
as a cycle through its intergenerational effects, which include the direct
transmission of wealth 6 and the indirect transmission of wealth through
opportunities that are associated with or fostered by wealth.
In the same way that we focused on household wealth in the previ-
ous section, we will focus on the household as the primary unit of consid-
eration in this section. We do so because children grow up in a house-
hold, and the household in which the children grow up fosters or
constrains their opportunities.
System 1: Education. The educational attainment of parents has a
strong effect on the educational achievement of their children.37 Educa-
tional attainment is the result of what one does with the opportunities
that are available. Past (and we would argue present) generations of
children have had their opportunities circumscribed because of race.38
As one commentator notes:
Black children reared in families without economic or educational
resources are unlikely, as adults, to have gained the kind of skills,
knowledge, and aspirations that many white children will have
gained from the day-to-day experience of being raised by an edu-
cated or economically privileged family. This relative lack of expe-
riential knowledge or understanding among black people in one
generation will affect the beliefs and aspirations of the next.39
ness rather than the unemployment figure which is much lower, 12.9% for black men in New York
City in 2003).
36. A current example of this kind of direct transmission of wealth can be seen in the baby boom
generation, which stands to inherit approximately seven trillion dollars between 1987 and 2011.
MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHfWHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 6 (1997). The baby boomers will in turn transmit a portion of that, or per-
haps even more, to the next generation.
37. Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705,748 n.249 (2004) ("The posi-
tive correlation between parental education and student achievement is well-established.") (citations
omitted).
38. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 155-270 (4th ed. 2000).
39. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative
Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683,734-35 (2004).
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Our continuing failure to eradicate this race effect means that a primary
vehicle for breaking the inequality cycle, education,"0 will not meaning-
fully change the status quo.
System 2: Housing. Where one lives has a strong impact on both
employment and educational opportunities.4 Residential segregation
eviscerated the hope that Brown would result in integration, one goal of
which was to lessen the prejudice in the hearts and minds of children
through their interaction with those of different races. With the fight
over bussing, 2 and the Supreme Court ruling against interdistrict reme-
dies,43 whites who had successfully fled to new school districts in the sub-
urbs were not subject to desegregation orders. The result-underfunded
inner city schools that were largely minority, and suburban schools that
were largely white-was a situation beyond the scope of legal redress as
accepted by the Court."
When the racial wealth effect based on discrimination in housing is
considered, a clearer picture of why there is such a large disparity in the
wealth of the average white household as compared with black and
Latina/o households emerges. Rather than duplicate or report in detail
the excellent work by scholars such as Douglas Massey and Nancy Den-
ton, 5 we will focus on a few examples that demonstrate the participation
of the state in enabling whites to participate in home ownership and dis-
abling blacks and other minorities from the same.
First, the government, until 1950, encouraged the use of racially re-
strictive covenants in the home loans that it underwrote through the
FHA and VA loan insurance programs.' Second, the loans underwritten
by the FHA and VA went primarily to whites.47 Third, the Federal
Home Owners' Loan Corporation used maps that coded neighborhoods
40. See Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School Finance Litiga-
tion, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 569, 571 (2004) ("Perhaps most importantly, though, the American
social system rests on two goals that require access to education: the 'melting pot' that absorbs diverse
populations into a pluralistic society and the upward mobility that allows us to overcome class barri-
ers.").
41. Henry G. Cisneros, With Liberty and Justice for All: How American Can Provide Fair Hous-
ing for All Its People, 1 HisP. L.J. 53, 59 (1994) ("[S]egregation in housing affects, and is in turn af-
fected by, school performance, employment opportunities, transportation accessibility, health, welfare,
crime, and a host of other issues.").
42. See, e.g., Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
43. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). For an excellent discussion of this case, see
Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Tales of White Folk: Doctrine, Narrative, and the Recon-
struction of Racial Reality, 84 CAL. L. REV. 377 (1996) (reviewing RICHARD DELGADO, THE
RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995)).
44. Hayman & Levit, supra note 43.
45. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 17 (1993).
46. See GEORGE A. LIPsITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: How WHITE PEOPLE
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS 26 (1998).
47. Id. at 6.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
on the basis of race to determine their creditworthiness.' The result was
that between 1934 and 1962, the FHA and VA programs made possible
the purchase of $120 billion of residential real estate. Less than two per-
cent went to nonwhite families.49 The effect of these discriminatory poli-
cies was magnified because private banks used these racial maps that
largely determined creditworthiness. °
If we take into account property appreciation and intergenerational
wealth transfers, then we begin to better understand the wealth dispari-
ties discussed above. If we add to this the connection between segre-
gated neighborhoods and educational opportunities, we can see more
clearly how our failure to address the racial disparities that exist with re-
gard to housing and its effect on wealth will result in the persistence of
racial disparities. Again, the cycle. Inequality begets inequality.
System 3: Family. Thus far, we have talked about some of the ways
that wealth begets wealth and is transmitted intergenerationally, directly
and indirectly. We should remember, though, that the family is the pri-
mary site for this transmission. Also, the family is not a race-neutral in-
stitution: racial-sexual policing operated directly through the legal form
of antimiscegenation laws, through the extralegal form of lynch law, and
indirectly through the segregation of neighborhoods, schools, and work-
places. The result was that as of 1987, ninety-nine percent of married
white Americans were married to other white Americans. 1 Although
the rate of interracial marriages has risen, families are still very monora-
cial. Insofar as wealth is concentrated in white households and families,
racial minorities have not been able to access this wealth through inter-
marriage. This has an ongoing impact on wealth disparities between the
races.
We are nearing the end of a twenty-five-year period during which
the baby boom generation has inherited approximately seven trillion dol-
lars from the previous generation.52 At the same time, "the average
black family headed by a person over the age of sixty-five has no net fi-
nancial assets to pass down to its children."53 It is not just that nothing is
going to be transmitted to the next generation in black families-the
older generation often is not in a position to be self-sufficient. Many of
them are drawing resources from their adult children. One result is that
black families, instead of being able to accumulate wealth and transmit it
directly and indirectly to their children, are instead having to devote
48. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 45, at 51-54 (detailing the practices of the Home Own-
ers' Loan Corporation, a government-sponsored program, which rated neighborhoods as creditworthy
or not, with Black neighborhoods redlined as the least creditworthy).
49. See LIPSITZ, supra note 46, at 6.
50. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 45, at 52.
51. Roger Sanjek, Intermarriage and the Future of Races in the United States, in RACE 103, 114
(Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994).
52. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 36, at 6.
53. Id. at 7.
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many of these resources to the previous generation. Perhaps this may
help explain one of our earlier observations -that black households in
the third income quintile have less than half the wealth of those white
households in the bottom income quintile. We see then how the family,
the primary site of wealth accumulation and intergenerational transmis-
sion, perpetuates racial wealth and opportunity gaps.
System 4: Health Care. Health care presents another example of the
comparative value of black and white lives. The story of Otis Jenkins, an
African American, is emblematic. When an infection in his foot became
gangrenous, it was amputated. He was not told of an alternative, though
more expensive, procedure that could have saved his limb. Unfortu-
nately, his is not the atypical case. For similar conditions, whites are
more likely to be told about and receive the alternative, limb-saving pro-
cedure than are blacks.54 But one might wonder if this difference in
treatment is due to differences in health care access and health insurance.
While this accounts for some differences in the treatment of whites and
blacks, a recent study reported in the New England Journal of Medicine
shows that race alone has a strong effect on the decisions doctors make.
In the study, videotapes were made of a patient interview with a white
and black person with identical scripts and identical medical information.
Several hundred doctors were asked to view the videotapes and prescribe
follow-up treatments. There was a marked disparity in the level and
quality of follow-up care based on the race of the patient, with the white
patient being recommended for better and more costly procedures than
the black patient.
To the extent that health care is less accessible to certain popula-
tions, this will have long-standing direct and intergenerational effects.
Prenatal and postnatal care and nutrition have a direct effect on brain
development and health through one's lifetime. Racial disparities in
health care have a tremendous effect on one's opportunities with regard
to education and employment, which then includes a strong intergenera-
tional effect.
System 5: Employment. Discrimination in employment limits one's
ability to acquire wealth, affects what neighborhoods one can reside in
and limits one's access to health care and one's ability to accumulate the
kinds of human and social capital that can be transmitted intergenera-
tionally to the next generation. Thus, racial discrimination in one gen-
eration transmits itself to the next.
System 6: Criminal Justice. To the extent that there is racial dis-
crimination in the criminal justice system, this too has intergenerational
effects. Involvement in the criminal justice system has the immediate ef-
fect of taking the person out of the work force during the time of incar-
ceration, and it affects one's prospects for future employment. Inability
54. American in Black and White: Health Care, the Great Divide (ABC Nightline, Feb. 24, 1999).
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or difficulty in acquiring gainful employment prevents or limits one from
acquiring wealth and affects where one can afford to live, which corre-
lates strongly with the quality of education available for the next genera-
tion. Discrimination in the criminal justice system has a compounding
effect.
Failure to understand how these systems or institutions operate will
lead to partial or ineffective remedies. The result is that the racial dis-
parities documented above will likely persist and continue to plague fu-
ture generations.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS MYOPIAS
Sometimes, an individual or a group faced with discrimination re-
sponds reflexively in an attempt to address the immediate harm(s) with-
out sufficient regard for the broader systems of oppression that may be in
place.55 We call this problem "civil rights myopia." We examine three
examples of civil rights myopias and the lessons they teach for those for-
mulating civil rights strategies.
A. "We're Not Black": A Lesson from Gong Lum v. Rice56
Sometimes, an oppressed individual or group may seek a remedy
that might solve their immediate problem, but which may leave intact the
broader system of oppression.57 The case of Gong Lum v. Rice5 is in-
structive in this regard. The case is sometimes described in Asian
American history texts as an early challenge by a Chinese immigrant fa-
ther on behalf of his American-born daughter against segregated public
education, taken all the way to the Supreme Court.5 9 It is also sometimes
celebrated as an early example of how Chinese immigrants did not
merely acquiesce to discrimination directed against them.' The fact that
the case arose in Mississippi in the 1920s merely adds to the case's mys-
tique.61
This description of the case may be a little misleading. The chal-
lenge to segregated schooling was not a direct challenge to the system of
separate schools; rather, it was an as-applied challenge to the way that
segregated schooling was used to deny enrollment in a white public
55. See Nathaniel Persily, The Right to be Counted, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1102-03 (2001) (re-
viewing PETER SKERRY, COUNTING ON THE CENSUS?: RACE, GROUP IDENTITY, AND THE EVASION OF
POLITICS (2000)).
56. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
57. See Persily, supra note 55, at 1102-03.
58. 275 U.S. at 78.
59. See SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 58 (1991). One of us
must confess to making this mistake in his first article. See Chang, supra note 5, at 1294. It is nice to
be able to correct youthful exuberance.
60. Chan, supra note 59, at 58.
61. Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 78; see Chan, supra note 59, at 58.
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school to then nine-year-old Martha Lum.62 At the time, the Mississippi
Constitution provided that "separate schools shall be maintained for
children of the white and colored races."'63 The challenge to the state of
Mississippi was how to deal with the Chinese within the state's black or
white racial paradigm.
Martha Lum's "lawyers knew better than to argue that Chinese
were White."'  Instead, they argued that as a person "of pure Chinese
origin and descent," she is not "colored," and in the absence of a public
school for those of Chinese ancestry, she should be permitted to attend
the white public school.65 This argument succeeded in the trial court
where Lum's attorneys won a mandamus petition, ordering school au-
thorities to permit her attendance in the white public school.' Accord-
ingly, the school district appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.67
Even though Martha Lum did not claim a white identity, in order to
define "colored" as that which is not "white," the Mississippi Supreme
Court devoted a good portion of its decision to determining that "white"
in the State Constitution was synonymous with the Caucasian race.' In
doing so, it followed the racial logic used by other states such as Califor-
nia and Louisiana.69 The Mississippi Supreme Court then classified Mar-
tha Lum as colored and left her with the choice of attending the colored
public schools of her district or attending a private school.7 ° The U.S.
Supreme Court later affirmed the state court's decision.7'
As indicated above, this case was pursued on behalf of Martha Lum
and did not seek to dismantle the system of segregated public educa-
tion.72 If successful, it would have resulted in expanded opportunities for
children of Chinese ancestry, but it still would have left Negro children
with inferior segregated schooling. In order to achieve this specific re-
sult:
Gong Lum's lawyers explicitly distanced Chinese from
Blacks.... [They] asked the [Mississippi Supreme] Court to take
judicial notice that the Jim Crow laws did not treat members of the
62. See Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 80-81.
63. Rice v. Gong Lum, 104 So. 105, 107 (Miss. 1925), affd, 275 U.S. 78, 81 (1927) (quoting MISS.
CONST. of 1890, § 207).
64. Taunya Lovell Banks, Both Edges of the Margin: Blacks and Asians in Mississippi Masala,
Barriers to Coalition Building, 5 AsIAN L.J. 7, 14 (1998).
65. Rice, 104 So. at 106-07.
66. Id. at 107.
67. Id. at 106.
68. Id. at 107-10.
69. See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (prohibiting Chinese testimony under a statute prohibit-
ing testimony by "Blacks," "Mulattos," and "Indians" against a white person, holding that Chinese
were included under the Indian category because Indians had migrated from Asia to the Americas via
a land bridge, or in the alternative that "Black" was a catch-all category for that which is not "White");
State v. Treadaway, 126 La. 300, 322 (1910) (holding that while a Negro is necessarily a person of
color, that there are persons of color who are not Negroes).
70. Rice v. Gong Lum, 139 Miss. 760,788 (1925).
71. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78,83 (1927).
72. See id. at 84.
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"Mongolian race" as belonging to the "Negro race." Japanese and
Chinese were classified together, and according to the brief, "fur-
nish some of the most intelligent and enterprising people. They cer-
tainly stand nearer to the [W]hite race than they do to the [N]egro
race. If the Caucasian is not ready to admit that the representative
Mongolian is his equal he is willing to concede that the Mongolian
is on the hither side of the half-way line between the Caucasian and
the African."73
As if this litigation strategy was not problematic enough, the Chinese
community in Mississippi responded to the Gong Lum decision by trying
to assimilate as much as possible into the white community, "ceas[ing] all
social contact with Blacks and ostraciz[ing] individual Chinese who con-
tinued to maintain social relations, including marriages, with Blacks."74
This decision by the Chinese living in Mississippi is criticized as
gaining at the expense of blacks and negating any possibility for a coali-
tion between blacks and Chinese, essentially "thwarting all hope of sub-
stantive racial equality for both groups."75 Thus, the Chinese, while gain-
ing some racial privilege, participated in their own subordination by
promoting a racial order where they remained racially oppressed.76 By
choosing this course, the Chinese forgot what brought them to Missis-
sippi in the first place. In fact, Chinese workers were imported to the
South during Reconstruction to replace black workers77 as part of a strat-
egy to racially stratify the labor force in order to deepen the exploitation
of all workers.78
This example shows that a binary racial system having two levels of
stratification may not be as efficient as a racial system with more levels of
stratification.79 Of course, stratification does not take place only along
racial lines, but it also includes class, gender, sexual orientation, and im-
migration and citizenship status.' Consequently, a myopic civil rights vi-
sion may improve the conditions for the immediate individual or group.
It may, however, result in little overall change and may in fact consoli-
73. Banks, supra note 64, at 15.
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. at 18.
76. One of us describes this aspect of society rewarding or supporting people who "reject our
race, reject our sexual orientation, and reject our gender" as the seventh aspect of self-hatred. Jerome
M. Culp, Jr., Seventh Aspect of Self-Hatred. Race, LatCrit, and Fighting the Status Quo, 55 FLA. L. REV.
425,427 (2003).
77. See JAMES W. LOEWEN, THE MISSISSIPPI CHINESE: BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE 21-26
(1971).
78. Cf. Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 229-30 (2003) (discussing con-
temporary racial stratification of the labor force fostered by immigration laws that create a disposable
labor force).
79. For two excellent analyses of the operation of racial stratification and labor exploitation, see
ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN
CALIFORNIA (1971); and CHRIS FRIDAY, ORGANIZING ASIAN AMERICAN LABOR: THE PACIFIC
COAST CANNED-SALMON INDUSTRY, 1870-1942 (1994).
80. See generally Roundtable, Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family
Law, 73 IND. L.J. 535 (1998).
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date or deepen the overall system of oppression that continues to op-
press that individual or group along with others.
B. "We're White, Too": Early LULAC Litigation Strategy
Unlike the attempt to secure a gain for Martha Lum and other Chi-
nese American children by distancing the Chinese from blacks, early
LULAC litigation strategy went further by claiming an explicit white ra-
cial identity.81 This legal strategy took advantage of an 1897 decision
which held that a Mexican immigrant claimant was legally white within
the purview of the naturalization laws and, therefore, eligible for U.S.
citizenship.82 The decision was premised on the operation of the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo,83 which provided citizenship for persons of Mexi-
can ancestry, and the naturalization laws, which limited naturalization to
free white persons and persons of African nativity or descent.'
This litigation strategy produced mixed results for Mexican Ameri-
cans. First, it was not always successful in securing the same rights as
"non-Mexican Whites."85 Furthermore, the strategy proved at times to
be too successful and backfired when it came to exclusion from juries.86
As Ian Haney Lopez has demonstrated in his article on LatCrit theory,
the Texas state courts eventually came around to LULAC's claim that
Mexicans were legally white and used it to reject claims of racial dis-
crimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when Mexican
Americans were excluded from juries.87 As other whites served on juries,
Mexican Americans, qua whites, had no legitimate complaint about ra-
cial discrimination under Strauder v. West Virginia'M and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Perhaps most importantly, this litigation strategy, similar to the
Gong Lur strategy, did not dismantle the overlying system of racial sub-
ordination and, in fact, reinforced it through the active participation and
collusion of (some) Mexican Americans in the system of racial subordi-
81. See generally DAVID G. GUTItRREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN AMERICANS,
MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICs OF ETHNICITY 79-87 (1995); George A. Martinez, The
Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 321, 338-39
(1997); Steven H. Wilson, Brown over "Other White": Mexican Americans' Legal Arguments and Liti-
gation Strategy in School Desegregation Lawsuits, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 145, 150-64 (2003).
82. In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337 (W.D. Tex. 1897).
83. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2,
1848, art. 8-9, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922,929-30.
84. Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 318 (1875).
85. See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American
Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555, 560-66 (1994) (recounting early cases
regarding public accommodations).
86. See Martinez, supra note 81, at 328.
87. See Rogers v. State, 236 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951); Sanchez v. State, 243 S.W.2d 700
(Tex. Crim. App. 1951)); Ian F. Haney L6pez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit
Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1169-70 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 57,83-84 (1998) (discussing Salazar v.
State, 193 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1946)).
88. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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nation. This strategy also foreclosed the possibility of coalition between
Mexican Americans and blacks to challenge the overarching system.
Thus far, we have discussed two similar civil rights myopias: Gong
Lum, which might be characterized as "don't apply Jim Crow to us be-
cause Jim Crow applies to blacks, and we're not black,"89 and the early
LULAC strategy, which might be characterized as "don't apply Jim
Crow to us because Jim Crow applies to blacks and we're white."'  We
turn now to the third civil rights myopia -the dilution claim.
C. "There's Not Enough to Go Around": African American Resistance
to Civil Rights Claims by the Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual Community
Alveda King, the niece of Martin Luther King, Jr., has stated that
"gays and lesbians as a group have never suffered the kinds of indignities
that black people have, and therefore any demands they make on
American society only demean the struggle that her uncle and countless
others died for in order to achieve basic equality for black people."91 The
fear seems to be that "comparing racism with some other form of bias
[has] eclipsed or diminished attention to the importance of racism alto-
gether."'
While we are cognizant of the dangers of analogizing between dif-
ferent forms of oppression93 and understand that, at some level, resources
are finite, we find repugnant the notion that adding gay/lesbian/bisexual
claims to the civil rights agenda will somehow dilute, or make more diffi-
cult, the efforts of traditional minorities to gain justice. We call this ho-
mophobia or heterosexism masquerading as a pragmatic claim.94 One
fallacy is the presumption that there is an African American community
that is distinct and separate from the gay/lesbian/bisexual community.95
They are, and have always been, overlapping communities.' Another
problem is that the dilution claim does not understand that different sys-
tems of oppression -racism, sexism, heterosexism, nativism, classism,
89. See supra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
91. Mark F. Johnson, Civil Rights and Wrongs (Homosexuality in Black America), HUMANIST,
Mar. 13, 1998, at 39.
92. Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and the "Civil Rights Agenda," 1
AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33, 39 (1994).
93. See generally Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397;
see also Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equiva-
lents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994).
94. Cf. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy
Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994).
95. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Criti-
cal Race Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1999).
96. Id. at 48-49.
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ableism-are not separate and, in fact, operate in ways that reinforce one
another. 7
Unfortunately, we do not have a unified field theory of oppression
to offer.98 We do, though, offer a methodological prescription that tries
to address these civil rights myopias.
D. A Prescription of Sorts
When addressing oppression, it is always necessary to ask the "other
groups" question. In suggesting this prescription, we borrow from femi-
nist legal scholars who ask "[t]he woman question."99 They ask "about
the gender implications of a social practice or rule: have women been
left out of consideration? If so, in what way; how might that omission be
corrected? What difference would it make to do so?"'" This strikes us
as a remarkably sensible thing to do.
We wish that the NAACP in San Francisco had considered these
questions in fashioning its consent decree in 1983 to desegregate San
Francisco schools.' We wish that the plaintiffs who brought a class ac-
tion lawsuit in 1994 to dissolve the consent decree had engaged in this
type of analysis." The complaint alleged that the upper limit placed on
the percentage of Chinese American students at Lowell, a magnet public
high school, operated to admit lesser-qualified African American,
Latina/o, white, and other Asian American applicants at the expense of
better-qualified Chinese American applicants. 03
If the San Francisco NAACP had engaged in an analysis similar to
that undertaken by feminist legal scholars, perhaps the consent decree
would have been different. Given the controversy that was growing even
then with regard to the issue of Asian American admissions to elite col-
leges,1" it was foreseeable that admissions ceilings for Asian Americans,
97. For some excellent work that tries to engage interlocking and reinforcing systems of oppres-
sion, see Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between
Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251 (2002); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthe-
sis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (1997); Peter Kwan, Complicity and Complexity: Cosynthesis
and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 673 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectional-
ity," "Multidimensionality, " and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 285 (2001); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identi-
ties & Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995).
98. In our contribution to a recent symposium on this topic, we made the modest suggestion that
those engaging in this analysis move beyond the political dimension to suggest specific points of inter-
vention with regard to legal doctrine. See Robert S. Chang & Jerome M. Culp, Jr., After Intersectional-
ity, 71 UMKC L. REV. 485,490 (2002).
99. Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837 (1990).
100. Id. Bartlett adds that "[a] question becomes a method when it is regularly asked." Id.
101. See Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854,856-57 (9th Cir. 1998).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Stanford University, for example, in investigating the differential rate of admissions for
Asian American applicants as compared with white applicants, seemed to implicitly acknowledge bias
against Asian Americans when it concluded that "the overrepresentation of whites among special
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or for specific Asian American groups, would create feelings of resent-
ment among Asian Americans. Perhaps this could have been addressed
through greater Asian American community involvement that would
have resulted in a buy-in of sorts by Asian American community groups,
and this greater involvement might have resulted in a differently fash-
ioned consent decree.
If the Ho plaintiffs had asked the "other groups" question, maybe
they would not have pursued the challenge in the way that they did.
Perhaps a lesson can be learned from what happened with regard to a
consent decree whereby the Los Angeles Police Department was or-
dered to increase its representation of women, African Americans, and
Hispanics."°5 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights discovered that Asian
Americans were afraid to sue later to be included in this consent decree
because of the fear that the entire decree, which benefits other minorities
and women, "could unravel."'' ° The Asian Americans who were dissatis-
fied with the consent decree asked the "other groups" question. Because
of this possible harmful effect on other minority groups and women, they
sacrificed their narrow self- and group interest and decided not to pursue
a court challenge. While we might laud the Asian Americans in the Los
Angeles example for taking this position, it is unfortunate that they were
placed in this position because of the failure of those involved in the
LAPD consent decree to ask the "other groups" question.
IV. THE INTENSIFICATION OF WHITE IDENTITY FOLLOWING BROWN
White people are made, not born. 7 Simone de Beauvoir made the
same claim about women.' 8 Both statements incorporate the idea that
race and gender are social categories that have been, and continue to be,
constructed. Much of the work on the social construction of race has fo-
cused on racial minority groups. There is a growing body of literature
that examines "whiteness" as a socially constructed racial category."°
groups such as alumni legacies, faculty/staff children, and athletes did not work to account for the dif-
ferential rate of admissions except in a relatively minor way." Grace W. Tsuang, Note, Assuring Equal
Access of Asian Americans to Highly Selective Universities, 98 YALE L. REV. 659, 670 n.77 (1989) (cit-
ing STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 1985-86 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON UNDERGRADUATE
ADMISSIONS AND FINANCIAL AIDS 5 (1986)).
105. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN AMERICANS IN THE
1990s 59 n.53 (1992).
106. Id.
107. Cf. ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 1
(1999) (making the same claim about Asian Americans).
108. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (1949).
109. See generally NOEL IGNATIEV, How THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); ERIC LOTT, LOVE
AND THEFT: BLACKFACE MINSTRELSY AND THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1993); DAVID R.
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING
CLASS (1991); MICHAEL ROGIN, BLACKFACE, WHITE NOISE: JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE
HOLLYWOOD MELTING POT (1996); CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
1198 (Vol. 2004
No.51 BROWN AND THE CONUNDRUM OF RACE IN AMERICA 1199
Much of the work in the legal literature has focused on certain aspects of
whiteness such as privilege,"' transparency,"' or guilt. 12
It seems to us that there has been less engagement with whiteness as
an oppositional identity category, experienced most intensely at two op-
posite extremes: when engaging in conscious racism" 3 or when feeling
like the victim of racial remediation.' 4 The former, which might include
whiteness experienced around participation in Aryan Nation or the kill-
ing of James Bird in Texas, is less interesting to us because it represents
an extreme form of racism that, unfortunately, has become the paradigm
for racism."5 The latter, though, requires attention because of how per-
vasive we believe this feeling to be.
Cheryl Harris brilliantly captures the way that whiteness is experi-
enced as property accompanied by a big bundle of sticks."6 She tracks
the way the Court shifted from protecting whiteness as status in Plessy"7
to whiteness as privilege in Brown."' She then proceeds to examine the
experience of whiteness around the racial remedy of affirmative action,
which many whites experience viscerally as reverse racism." 9 We agree
with her analysis, but we want to extend it further to encompass any form
of racial remediation. Under this view, any form of desegregation will be
experienced negatively by whites who value consciously/unconsciously/
subconsciously the attendant privileges of whiteness. This negative feel-
ing will range from annoyance at the imposition to outright anger over
the theft of their white privilege. The resentment that racial remediation
fosters will strengthen whiteness experienced as an oppositional identity.
We believe that civil rights advocates have underestimated the intensity
and pervasiveness of this feeling among whites.
In order for civil rights advocates to address this problem, we need
to understand that this oppositional white identity has evolved in the fifty
years since Brown and has become animated primarily by the ideology of
neutrality. The result is that it does not appear the same as the white
citizens' councils; it does not have the appearance of massive white resis-
110. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Sys-
tems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 881 (1995).
111. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953 (1993).
112. See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstrac-
tion, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1990). We take Ross's description of white innocence claims as being
rooted in white guilt.
113. See Nancy Dowd, Resisting Essentialism and Hierarchy: A Critique of Work/Family Strategies
for Women Lawyers, 16 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 185, 197 (2000) ("Whites produce status for them-
selves by discriminating against people of color.").
114. This includes so-called reverse racism, but is a broader concept.
115. Too much antidiscrimination law is limited by the idea of the perpetrator perspective. See
Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1053-54 (1978).
116. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707 (1993).
117. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
118. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
119. Harris, supra note 116, at 1766-91.
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tance to desegregation in all its forms. Instead, it is cloaked in seemingly
unassailable neutral forms that animate and promote the notion of white
innocence, which sets up whiteness as an oppositional identity.
Neutrality, though, at this point in history, is not so different from
the behavior of the white citizens' councils. It is marked by a failure to
understand the social forces that created and maintained racial inequal-
ity. Neutrality, now the primary marker for white oppositional identity,
is one that involves complicity -accepting the fruit of the poisonous tree
of slavery, Jim Crow, and "neutral" market forces that continue to foster
disparate wealth accumulation along racial lines, which results in dispa-
rate racial transmission of both wealth and opportunities intergenera-
tionally.
For racial groups such as Asian Pacific Americans, the question will
be to what extent we will, through our neutral pursuit of good neighbor-
hoods, good schools, good marriage partners, good jobs, good health
care, and safe communities, participate and also benefit from the fruit of
that poisonous tree called the American Dilemma.
V. CONCLUSION
In Part II, we examined racial inequality as measured by wealth,
along with some of the systems and social institutions that operate to en-
trench this inequality. Part III explored some of the shortcomings of civil
rights advocates due to what we described as civil rights myopias. In Part
IV, we addressed the problem that arises around any racial remediation
scheme because of the concomitant intensification of white racial feeling
and identity.
All this leads ultimately to the question of what kind of nation we
aspire to be. We can be a nation that tries to honor the best sentiments
found in the Constitution. The way to honor those sentiments is to give
them meaning, to provide for meaningful relief when we violate those
sentiments. But as a nation, we are much better at making lofty state-
ments about liberty and opportunity than we are at creating the material
conditions necessary to effectuate liberty and opportunity for communi-
ties, families, and individuals who have been denied liberty and opportu-
nity. Perhaps that is one way to understand Brown I and Brown H.
Brown I stands for the lofty principle, Brown II, for the failure to effec-
tuate it. The result, as we've demonstrated, is a cycle where inequality is
perpetuated. Fifty years after Brown, we are able to stand here and look
back and pass judgment on the failure of this nation to bring about
Brown's promise. As we indicated at the beginning of this article, if the
past is any indication, we predict that Brown's promise will remain unful-
filled on its hundredth anniversary. One difference, though, is that we
will be the ones who are being judged by the next generations. We
would like to leave behind a different legacy.
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EPILOGUE BY ROBERT CHANG
Here, I step out of the authorial "we" to construct this epilogue. I
include this epilogue because my coauthor Jerome often ended his pieces
with an epilogue. You look at his articles, and there would be a false
ending or two followed by an epilogue. I think this is because even at the
end of an article, he always had more to say. At his passing in February
2004, he still had so much to say. Even through his battle to keep his
transplanted kidney, the ideas for articles and books kept coming. But
one thing we did not talk about was the epilogue for this article. I am left
to imagine what he would want us to say.
He might have wanted to talk about his nephews and nieces. He
might have wanted me to talk about my son. He cared so much about
the next generations. He might have wanted us to end on a message of
hope for them. Or he might have wanted us to end on a note of anger on
their behalf. One thing, though, he would have wanted us to avoid is bit-
terness.
Walter Dellinger, at Jerome's Memorial Service, ended his brief
remarks by saying, "Oh how he fought." Let us learn from Jerome and
put aside the bitterness that can wither the heart. Let us fight with hope,
with anger, and with humility.
1202 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2004
